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ABSTRACT
We study the Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance program as a bellwether for designs of private,
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their choices of plans. Our analysis of administrative data on medical claims in Medicare Part D suggests
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Plan Finder provided by the Medicare administration, that conditions next year’s plan choice only
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are hard to reconcile with decision costs alone; it appears that unless a sizeable fraction of consumers
value plan features other than cost, they are not optimizing effectively.
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1. Introduction 
Health-care systems with mandated health insurance financed from some combination of 
consumer, employer, and government sources are standard in all developed countries except the 
United States, where about 18 percent of the non-elderly population is currently uninsured (Gru-
ber, 2008), and many of the insured face financially risky gaps in coverage.  The health cost of 
incomplete coverage is substantial:  In comparison with other countries, the United States ranks 
25th in the survival rate from age 15 to age 60, which impacts the population of workers and 
young parents whose loss is a substantial cost to families and to the economy.1  If the U.S. could 
raise its survival rate for this group to that of Switzerland, a country that has mandatory standard-
ized coverage offered by private insurers, this would prevent more than 190,000 deaths per year.  
The elderly in the United States aged 65 and older do have universal coverage under the Medi-
care program, with prescription drug coverage (Medicare Part D) added in 2006.  This may ex-
plain the somewhat better comparative performance of the United States for seniors, a rank of 
14th in life expectancy at age 65.  Since the U.S. has a population that at retirement has the poor-
est health in the developed world, this is a medical accomplishment, but it is very costly – U.S. 
health expenditures per capita are 50 percent higher than those in any other country. 
Medicare Part D provides the Medicare-eligible population with universal access to a sub-
sidized market for non-mandatory standardized prescription drug coverage through government-
approved contracts sponsored by private insurance firms; see Bach and McClellan (2005).  This 
new market is representative of a trend toward “consumer-directed healthcare” that relies on con-
sumer behavior and competition among insurance firms to attain satisfactory allocation of health 
care resources with limited government regulation, and is one model for more comprehensive 
reform of health care insurance (see Newhouse, 2004; Buntin et al., 2006; Goodman, 2006; and 
the references therein). Overall, Medicare Part D is considered a success story:  Despite a rocky 
start, enrollment rates are high2, consumers have a broad choice of sponsors, and premiums are 
                                                 
1
 These statistics are based on World Health Organization data for 2006, and U.S. Census data on 
population by age in 2006. 
2
 In the first year of Medicare Part D, more than 90% of the eligible population obtained prescription drug 
coverage, either from a Medicare Part D plan or a source with comparable coverage (Heiss, McFadden, and Winter, 
2006). 
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lower than anticipated by policymakers and insurers (Heiss, McFadden, and Winter, 2006, 2007; 
Goldman and Joyce, 2008; Duggan, Healy, and Scott Morton, 2008).3   
Despite these successes, making optimal, or even just reasonable, decisions in the Part D 
market is difficult for seniors. Typically, about 40 drug plans are in the choice set of an individual 
in most Medicare regions, once she has decided that she wants to enroll in a Part D stand-alone 
Prescription Drug Plan (PDP). When choosing among these plans, individuals face uncertainty 
with respect to their future health status and drug needs, and rather complicated benefit schedules 
and formularies with a coverage gap and other peculiar institutional features of the Part D pro-
gram.4 Plan choice was considered a major problem of Medicare Part D right from the beginning 
(see, e.g., Neuman and Cubanski, 2009), and the Medicare administration (the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services, or CMS) has undertaken an extensive program of outreach to pro-
vide relevant information and guidance to consumers. In particular, such efforts include its Plan 
Finder, an internet tool that gives the available plans, premiums, and out-of-pocket costs for a 
medicine cabinet specified by the consumer.  A range of industry-specific factors – market con-
centration of insurers, jockeying by insurers in their formulary and benefit designs, their market-
ing to new and existing enrollees, and their bargains with pharmaceutical companies – all have 
the potential to reduce the social benefit of the Part D program.  Management of these market 
features and orderly and efficient operation of the Part D market will require continuing vigilance 
from CMS.   
How seniors decide whether to enroll in Medicare Part D, and what plans they select, is 
important not only for management of the Part D program, but also is an informative experiment 
on how consumers behave in real-world decision situations with a complex, ambiguous structure 
and high stakes, and may yield predictions for how they will handle plan choices in the new gen-
                                                 
3
 We have pointed out elsewhere (Heiss, McFadden, and Winter, 2009) that variety in available levels of 
coverage has diminished sharply for individual buyers in the first three years of operation of the Part D market. 
Offerings of plans with the most comprehensive coverage have collapsed, and plans with intermediate coverage are 
at risk of a death spiral of rising premiums and falling enrollment, a phenomenon predicted for this market by Pauly 
and Zeng (2004) as a consequence of adverse selection, and observed in other health insurance markets; see Cutler 
and Reber (1998).  Union and employer-provided retiree plans that are coordinated with Part D, and Medicare 
Advantage plans that bundle drug coverage with other medical services in an HMO-like setting, are not subject to the 
same selection pressures, and continue to offer a variety of coverage levels.  However, health insurance provided 
under retiree plans is dropping in the working population, and individual policies for prescription drugs will become 
more important in the future. 
4
 In addition to the monthly premium, features of PDP include deductibles, copayment percentage or 
copayment tiers in an initial coverage range up to an initial coverage limit, level of coverage in the gap (the doughnut 
hole between the initial coverage limit and a catastrophic coverage threshold), copayment rules above the 
catastrophic coverage threshold, formulary restrictions, etc., all explained in more detail later. 
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eral health insurance exchanges that will implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010.  
In this paper, we examine how well consumers did in choosing their Medicare Part D in-
surance plan. A number of papers have considered this issue, but mostly with rather specific or 
small samples, and also with somewhat inconsistent findings.  
Abaluck and Gruber (2011) use comprehensive pharmacy data provided by Wolters Klu-
wer that cover almost one-third of all third-party prescription drug transactions. They match these 
data with information on the characteristics of all the plans available to the individuals in the 
dataset. Abaluck and Gruber find that in their plan choice, individuals place more weight on plan 
premiums than on expected out-of-pocket costs. Also, individuals value plan financial character-
istics in excess of their possible impacts on financial expenses or risk, while placing almost no 
value on variance-reducing aspects of plans. 
Ketcham et al. (2011) analyze a large data set from a “single insurer that sells Part D plans 
(PDPs) and administers PDPs sold by other companies”. The data contain information on indi-
viduals’ chosen and available plans, prescription drug use and spending, and other characteristics. 
Their analysis focuses on the issue of whether the choices of Medicare Part D enrollees improved 
over the first two years of the Medicare Part D program in terms of reducing overspending, de-
fined as “the consumers annual ex post out-of-pocket (OOP) costs for insurance and prescription 
drugs above the cost of the cheapest alternative, where the alternatives include other Part D plans 
as well as having no coverage”. They find large reductions in “over-spending” from 2006 to 
2007, which they attribute mostly to plan switching. These findings contrast with those of Kling 
et al. (2011) who argue that consumers’ choices are subject to substantial “comparison frictions” 
and arrive at a more pessimistic conclusion about consumers’ ability to choose the best plans.  
Our paper is the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of plan choice in the Part D 
market using a large random sample from the entire Medicare-eligible population. Our data, Part 
D claims records for three years, 2006–2008, combined with Parts A and B claims records for 
2002-2008, have been provided by the Medicare administration (the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, or CMS) under a special data use agreement.  These records give administra-
tive information on plan choice, drug use, health conditions, out-of-pocket costs, and premiums. 
The data on drug use are particularly detailed, thus avoiding the need to impute an individual’s 
drug bill from self-reported survey data (as discussed in Winter et al., 2006).  Using these Medi-
 5 
care A, B, D data, we study both enrollment choices in the first three years of Medicare Part D 
(2006–2008) and plan choice among those enrolled, conditional on previous year’s drug use, in 
the years 2007 and 2008. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data 
and the approach taken for simulating the relevant attributes of alternative plans available to each 
consumer. We use the administrative data on drug spending to characterize Part D enrollment 
decisions in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the analytical framework for analyzing ex ante 
and ex post optimization failures, along with the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
2.1 Data sources and definition of working samples 
Our study starts with a draw of all records from the Medicare denominator files for the 
years 2006, 2007, and 2008 that have an HIC code ending in the digits ‘0’ or ‘5’.  The denomina-
tor file is an administrative list of all persons in the United States who are eligible for Medicare 
benefits, and each person enrolled in Medicare for one or more days in a year has a unique identi-
fier, the HIC code, that is associated with them for the duration of their enrollment in Medicare.5  
Then, this draw is in each year a 20 percent representative sample of all people enrolled in Medi-
care at some point in the year, and all persons enrolled in any year appear longitudinally across 
all the years in which they are enrolled by virtue of retaining their HIC code with the same termi-
nal digit (or being tracked through a change in HIC code for their primary beneficiary).  The 20 
percent sample grows each year as new people become eligible (primarily by reaching age 65 or 
developing a qualified disability), and shrinks as people become ineligible (primarily through 
death or recovery from a qualified disability).  Each record in the 20 percent sample is linked to 
(1) Medicare Parts A and B claims beginning in 2002, or date of enrollment if later, giving data 
on diagnoses and treatments, (2) a file giving Part D enrollment status and (encrypted) plan 
choice in each of the years 2006, 2007, and 2008, and (3) for those enrolled in stand-alone pre-
scription drug plans (PDP), all prescription drug claims, including medication, benefits paid, total 
prescription cost, and copayments.   
                                                 
5
 When an individual moves from one household to another, and is not a primary beneficiary in either, the 
HIC code assigned to this beneficiary switches to reflect the new primary beneficiary, and will no longer necessarily 
end in ‘0’ or ‘5’.  However, as of 2006 these individuals are tracked through the HIC code change, their claims are 
retained in the 20 percent draw, and their claim records under their previous HIC code are retained.  We have not yet 
obtained full documentation of these procedures, and this description may be modified to reflect actual practice.  
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The 20 percent representative sample includes 9,086,340 beneficiaries in 2006; 9,299,848 
in 2007; and 9,530,609 in 2008. Table 1 shows how the working samples are constructed from 
the initial 20 percent samples by applying a number of exclusion criteria.  The reduced sample 
comes primarily from (1) the exclusion of Part D non-enrollees and late enrollees, (2) the exclu-
sion of dual-eligibles, people under 65 who are eligible due to disability, and people with low-
income subsidies, many of whom were directed to Medicare Advantage plans that do not break 
out prescription drug use, and (3) the exclusion of people on retiree plans who do not have unre-
stricted plan choice.  Most of these exclusions are part of the definition of our target population 
of consumers in stand-alone PDP where study of plan choice is of interest and drug claims re-
cords are available. For our final working samples, we also exclude people who do not have Part 
D coverage throughout the year, people not enrolled in stand-alone PDP plans throughout the 
year, people who switch plans during the year, people enrolled in employer group waiver 
(EGWP) plans, people not living in the United States, and people without prior year claims in-
formation. An appendix table gives a breakdown by age of the patterns of part and full year 
Medicare enrollment.   
Because of the exclusion restrictions we apply, the numbers of beneficiaries in our work-
ing sample do not match up directly with published statistics. Consider the 20 percent sample in 
2007. Of the 9,299,848 beneficiaries on the denominator file, 87 percent are identified as having 
some form of prescription drug coverage at some point in 2007.  This is a little less than the 90 
percent coverage rate targeted by CMS and achieved in various enrollment reports; the difference 
may be under-reporting in the denominator file of some forms of coverage that are counted by 
CMS in total coverage.  The share of the 9,299,848 beneficiaries with Part D coverage at some 
point in 2007 is 56.1 percent, and with Part D coverage throughout the year is 48.7 percent.  
These shares reflect individuals with creditable or retiree coverage who are not enrolled in Part 
D, and individuals who move into Part D from non-Part D plans, in some cases because they be-
come newly eligible during the year.   
2.2 From prescription drug claims data to simulated plan choices 
For each beneficiary, we observe a complete record of each prescription filled and submit-
ted to Medicare for reimbursement in each of the years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each claim in-
cludes detailed information on the payment for the particular drug and quantity dispensed, days 
supplied, which tier the insurance plan classifies the drug on, the benefit phase associated with 
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each claim, the national drug classification (NDC) code of the drug, and the prescription’s date. 
This information forms the beneficiary’s claim history that will be used to simulate their out-of-
pocket (OOP) copayments for prescriptions, and the sum of their simulated OOP copayments and 
premiums, which we call Consumer Inclusive Cost (CIC), in each of the insurance plans available 
to them.  
 Our simulation predicts a beneficiary’s out-of-pocket spending among each available 
stand-alone Part D plan in his region. There are two main parts to this simulation: (1) construct-
ing the formulary and benefit design (FBD) for each plan, and (2) running each beneficiary’s 
claim history through these FBDs and calculating out-of-pocket (OOP) spending based on each 
plan’s various rules and copayment provisions.  
2.2.1 Construction of empirical FBDs 
CMS data confidentiality rules encrypt the identities of plans in our Part D data.  Conse-
quently, we cannot assign published plan formularies from public CMS records to these en-
crypted identifiers, and are unable to calculate from actual formularies the benefits and out-of-
pocket costs for plans available but not chosen.  As a substitute, we construct an empirical formu-
lary for each insurance plan that is the union of all the NDC codes of claims of enrollees in our 
Part D data who are in plans with the same formulary identifier in a specified year.  The most 
popular formulary in 2007 had almost 900,000 enrollees, while the median formulary had 7,385 
enrollees.  The chance that a formulary drug will be captured by this method is low for uncom-
mon drugs in formularies with low numbers of enrollees.6  Thus, the assumption that only drugs 
observed with claims are covered by each plan’s formulary may make the coverage of smaller 
plans appear less generous than in reality.   
There are five types of Part D stand-alone PDPs.  A Standard plan has an administratively 
specified benefit schedule with four phases – an annual deductible, an initial coverage phase with 
a 25 percent copayment, a gap or doughnut hole with no coverage between an initial coverage 
limit (ICL) and a catastrophic coverage threshold (CCT), and a catastrophic phase above the CCT 
with a 5 percent copayment.  In 2007, the deductible was $265, the ICL was $2400, and the CCT 
was reached when OOP costs reached $3850, attained at a drug bill of $5451.25.  These limits are 
                                                 
6
 A drug ranked 500 in prescription frequency is used by about 0.21 percent of enrollees, and in the median 
enrollment empirical formulary is almost certainly captured; the probability is 1 - (1 - 0.0021)7385.  For the drug 
ranked 1000, the prescription frequency is 0.03 percent , and the chance of capture is 90 percent, while for the drug 
ranked 2000, the prescription frequency is 0.003 percent and the chance of capture is 19 percent.  
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adjusted by CMS each year.  Actuarially Equivalent plans differ from the Standard plan only by 
substituting copayment tiers for copayment percentages, keeping benefit generosity the same on 
average. Basic Alternative plans eliminate the deductible phase, and are required to be at least as 
generous as the Standard plan. Enhanced plans offer two types of gap coverage, either full cover-
age, or coverage of generic drugs only, at the equivalent of a 25 percent copayment rate.  En-
hanced plans reduce OOP costs through the gap phase, so that higher drug bills are required to 
reach the CCT.7   
Our data identify plan types, and for each drug appearing in the empirical formulary of a 
plan, its branded/generic/preferred status classification and tier classification.  Many beneficiaries 
in stand-alone PDP plans have one or more covered claims for drugs listed on a tier that is higher 
than the highest tier covered by the plan or a tier classified as “NA”. The NDC claims for drugs 
so classified never appear on a regular tier in other claims for enrollees in the plan, indicating that 
they are in most cases benefits paid as the result of appeals rather than administrative coding er-
rors or off-schedule purchases, such as replacements of lost prescriptions. After empirically ex-
amining the cost sharing associated with such claims by benefit phase, we assign “off-tier” claims 
no coverage in the deductible or doughnut hole, 25 percent coinsurance in the pre-ICL phase, and 
5 percent coinsurance in the catastrophic phase. Roughly 20 percent of the sample has at least one 
off-tier claim so this is a pervasive phenomenon. 
We estimate a benefit design for each plan based on drug classification, phase-dependent 
empirical tier copayment rate, days supplied, and the type of pharmacy that fills the prescription. 
These aspects of the benefit design, and other elements that we take into account, are summarized 
in Table 2.  The steps described above then provide an empirical formulary and benefit design for 
each plan and year that can be used to estimate the annual OOP cost of any specified list of pre-
scriptions supplied under that plan. 
2.2.2 Simulation of OOP copayments for alternative plans 
Each person in our working sample has realized OOP costs in the claims data in their cho-
sen plan for the prescriptions they use during a year; we term the list of prescriptions filled their 
medicine cabinet (MC).  To study the quality of plan choices, we must impute “what if” OOP 
                                                 
7
 For example, in 2007 a drug bill of $14,175 was required for an enrollee with full gap coverage to reach 
the CCT.  Consequently, this enrollee co-paid at a 25 percent rate rather than the Standard plan 5 percent rate for 
drug bills between $5451.25 and $14,175, eventually repaying all the benefits received from gap coverage.       
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costs in the available plans that were not chosen.  To do this, we impute adjusted OOP costs from 
our simulation of the formulary and benefit design of each plan, and use these imputed OOP costs 
for both the chosen and alternative plans.  The imputation avoids some anomalies due to tier cod-
ing and off-schedule drug purchases, and potential bias in comparing actual and imputed OOP 
costs, but also misses some payment variations actually experienced.  In this imputation, each 
person’s claims history is run through the empirical FBD described above for a particular plan to 
estimate their OOP should they have been enrolled in that plan. The simulations are performed on 
each of the plans in the beneficiary’s choice set determined by the Medicare-defined region (of 
34) in which she lives. When claims straddle two or more benefit phases, we split the claim into 
parts corresponding to each benefit phase and apply the associated cost sharing for that compo-
nent. We make five assumptions about prescription drug utilization: 
A1 Same order of drug utilization. Individuals follow the same order of drug consumption in 
each alternative plan as is actually observed in their chosen plan. Any substitution is 
based only on the type of drug, but not the quantity or timing of utilization.  
A2 Sorting claims on the same date. It is common for multiple prescriptions to be filled on 
the same day. The order in which such claims are processed may be important for calcu-
lating a patient’s OOP if one of the claims straddles two benefit phases. To achieve rep-
licable simulation results, some sorting rule must be imposed for claims occurring on the 
same day. We assume that multiple claims on the same day are sorted first based on the 
benefit phase recorded in the beneficiary’s chosen plan and are then sorted second based 
on the total cost of the drug (from low to high).  
A3 Pharmacy choice to minimize OOP cost. In reality, the choice of where to fill prescrip-
tions is likely based on differences in both OOP cost and convenience. However, we as-
sume that beneficiaries will always fill prescriptions at pharmacies and in quantities offer-
ing the lowest annual OOP cost.  Our assumption assures comparability in costs across 
consumers and plans, and to the extent that higher OOP costs incurred at local pharmacies 
or for more frequent refills simply reflect consumers’ valuations of the added conven-
ience, our measure is the correct benchmark for OOP cost comparisons.  
A.4 Zero price elasticity of drug use.   We assume that if a consumer uses a drug in their cho-
sen plan, then they will use the same quantity and dosage of this drug, or a therapeutic 
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equivalent, in any alternative plan, irrespective of price differences across plans and 
drugs. 
A.5 Drug substitution.  We simulate OOP costs under two alternative assumptions on drug 
substitutions.  The first assumption is no drug substitution, so a specific drug used in the 
consumer’s chosen plan would also be used if the consumer were enrolled in an alterna-
tive plan, even if it is on a different tier or is not covered in the alternative plan formu-
lary.8  This alternative may overstate the OOP cost of meeting the same therapy needs in 
alternative plans, and make chosen plans look better than they are.  The second alternative 
assumption is that whenever a drug used in a chosen plan is not in the formulary of an al-
ternative plan, then that drug is replaced in both the chosen and alternative plans by low-
est-price therapeutic equivalents.  The rules we adopt here are similar to those used by the 
CMS Plan Finder for calculating the costs of alternative plans.9  Note that if a consumer 
uses a branded drug that is in the formulary of her current plan, and has a strict preference 
for this brand over an alternative brand classified as therapeutically equivalent, our calcu-
lation with drug substitution can understate the OOP cost to this individual of meeting her 
perceived drug needs under both the chosen and alternative plans. 
2.2.3 Validity of the simulation  
The simulation’s internal validity is tested by examining the difference in actual OOP 
spending and simulated adjusted OOP spending (without drug substitution) for each beneficiary 
in their chosen plan. Actual OOP is defined as the sum of patient payments not reimbursed by a 
third party, all qualified third party payments, and patient liability reductions due to coordination 
of benefits from other payers. The median difference is $0, the mean difference is -$33, and the 
correlation coefficient exceeds 0.98. This compares favorably to a similar simulation check pre-
sented in Ketcham et al. (2011). Figure 1 below displays the distribution of this difference for 
beneficiaries with differences less than $1000 in absolute value, which make up more than 99.5 
percent of the distribution.  The small size of these differences for most beneficiaries suggests 
                                                 
8
 Under CMS rules, OOP payments for off-formulary drugs do not count in the accumulated “True OOP” 
(TrOOP) costs that determine qualification for catastrophic coverage.  Our simulation does not account for this 
additional cost of alternative plans.  In practice, this will have little influence on our analysis, as plans requiring off-
formulary drugs are rarely cost competitive even without accounting for this potential added cost. 
9
 One difference is that Plan Finder asks consumers which pharmacies they would like to use, without 
providing any cost information, and then bases cost estimates on those choices. Our simulation chooses the lowest 
cost pharmacy to calculate OOP cost since we cannot observe the consumer’s preferences for different pharmacies.  
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that the simulation performs reasonably well and is likely accurate for predicting OOP spending 
in the plans not chosen. However, there are still some outliers for whom the difference between 
simulated and actual OOP is large. Figure 2 plots the empirical mean of simulated OOP cost 
against overall drug bill for consumers on various plans, and compares this with the designed 
standard plan benefit schedule.  The figure indicates that the simulated benefits for Standard and 
Actuarially Equivalent plans conform well to the designed schedule over the phases where bene-
fits are paid, but give somewhat higher OOP costs when drug bills are in the gap.  This may be a 
statistical artifact, or may be evidence that consumers are being surcharged on drugs purchased in 
the gap where there is no coverage. The OOP costs for plans with brand and generic gap cover-
age show the expected reduction of OOP costs in the gap phase. The relatively higher OOP costs 
for plans covering only generics in the gap phase may suggest that branded drugs are the primary 
cost driver at that level of spending.    
For comparability of chosen and non-chosen plans, we use hereafter annual imputed ad-
justed OOP costs of a medicine cabinet, with or without drug substitution, rather than a mix of 
observed OOP costs for the chosen plan and imputed OOP costs for alternative plans.  An impor-
tant measure for consumers is the sum of annual imputed adjusted OOP cost and premiums, 
which we term Consumer Inclusive Cost (CIC). 
3. Enrollment choices 
We begin our analysis of the administrative data on Medicare Part D by looking at the en-
rollment decision; this complements earlier research that used survey data such as Winter et al. 
(2009) and Heiss et al. (2006, 2009). The Part D program is heavily subsidized, with insurers 
reimbursed from government general revenues for about 75 percent of overhead and benefits paid 
out, with fairly tightly regulated formulary and benefit design and competitively determined pre-
miums.  As a result, the program is first-year actuarially favorable for most eligible people, even 
before considering the value of reducing risk and the option value of avoiding delayed enrollment 
penalties if a Part D plan becomes attractive in the future (Winter et al., 2006). 
The marketing and information provided on Part D policies by insurers and by CMS focus 
on the expected benefits rather than on risk reduction.  In particular, the CMS Plan Finder invites 
users to list current drugs, and then provides a list of available plans ranked by out-of-pocket cost 
if the current drug use continues through the coming year.  While consumers could in principle 
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use Plan Finder on a “what if” basis by introducing counterfactual drugs and dosages, it would be 
cumbersome to do this and combine the results into an analysis of expected plan benefits and 
costs. No information is provided on the likelihood that the person will have different drug needs, 
the ability of plans to meet these needs, and the reduction in risk offered by plans with more gen-
erous coverage.  As a result, consumers are nudged toward lowest cost plans under the static 
forecast that current drug use will continue without change, rather than being nudged toward 
overall risk management. 
This said, current drugs and annual drug bills are good predictors of one-year-ahead drug 
needs.  The correlation of total drug bills in adjacent years is about 0.75, reflecting high persis-
tence in patterns of use of individual drugs.  As a result, persons with modestly high drug bills 
can expect to be ahead of the game by enrolling, even if they are not risk-adverse or concerned 
about the late enrollment penalty and future options.  In addition, conditioned on this information 
there is significant risk reduction from enrollment.  Figure 3 gives the cumulative distribution 
function of 2007 total drug bills. Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for this distribution, and also 
for the distribution of 2008 total drug bills, for the population that had full-year enrollment in a 
stand-alone prescription drug insurance plan in both years.  The correlation of total drug bills in 
the two years is 0.7437. 
Figure 4 gives the complementary cumulative distribution functions for 2008 total drug 
bills, conditioned on the 2007 drug bill percentiles.  As the relatively high inter-year correlation 
implies, these CCDF are relatively tightly distributed around the 2007 levels, but with some re-
gression to the mean.  However, they have relatively thick right tails.  Figure 5 plots the condi-
tional mean of the 2008 total drug bill, and the contour giving the approximate 95th percentile, 
against the 2007 total drug bill.  The scales are logarithmic, so that this graph shows substantial 
risk of large increases in drug bills over the previous year.  Below a 2007 drug bill of $2317 (the 
71st percentile), the 2008 conditional mean exceeds the 2007 drug bill, and above this level, the 
reverse is true, reflecting regression to the mean. 
A myopic consumer who considers only first-year benefits from a Part D plan and is risk 
neutral should enroll if expected benefits received exceed the premium.  Consider a Part D stan-
dard or equivalent plan in 2008, which had a typical premium of $30 per month.  Figure 6 gives 
the probability, conditioned on 2007 total drug bill, that an enrollee in the standard plan will be 
ahead of the game in the first year, with benefits exceeding the annual premium.  For 2007 drug 
bills above $690, this probability exceeds 50 percent.  The probability peaks at a 2007 drug bill of 
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about $5000, and thereafter declines slightly, apparently due to elevated mortality risk for people 
with very high drug bills.  Figure 7 gives the expected cost conditioned on the 2007 total drug bill 
for non-enrollment, enrollment in a Silver (i.e., standard or equivalent) plan, and enrollment in a 
Gold (i.e., generic drug coverage in the gap) plan with a premium at the national average of 
$63.34 per month.  These curves assume that 50 percent of drug costs in the gap are generic.  At a 
2007 drug bill of $470, corresponding to a 2008 expected drug bill of $760, enrollment in a Silver 
plan breaks even with non-enrollment in terms of expected cost.  Then, if risk aversion and an 
option value for avoiding a late enrollment penalty in future years are not considerations, 19.5 
percent of the eligible population is best off not enrolling.  At a drug bill of $3,744 in 2007, cor-
responding to an expected drug bill of $3,570 in 2008, the Silver and Gold plans break even in 
terms of expected cost.  Then, the 9.5 percent of the eligible population with the highest 2007 
drug bills is best off with a Gold plan.  Moreover, if first-year payoff is the only criterion and risk 
is not a consideration, about 12 percent of those enrolling in Part D plans would choose a Gold 
plan. 
In an earlier analysis of Part D enrollment choices using a national sample of about 2,500 
eligible people, Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2009) found that 23.8 percent of those not auto-
matically enrolled in Part D through retiree plans or Medicaid chose to not enroll.  CMS tabula-
tions from the denominator file give 15.1 percent of the eligible population without drug insur-
ance of some creditable form in 2008 – this will translate into a higher percentage of those who 
are active deciders with a personal choice of whether to enroll and if so what plan to choose; see 
Table 4.  While these rates bracket the 19.5 percent that the simple analysis above would suggest 
if consumers are myopic and risk-neutral, the actual pattern of non-enrollment was much more 
random, including many who left money on the table in the first year as the result of their enroll-
ment choice.  The earlier finding was that non-enrollment was concentrated among those with 
low but above-poverty incomes, low education, and relatively low prior drug use.  The earlier 
analysis also found that when the option value of Part D insurance without a late enrollment pen-
alty is taken into account, only a few percent of very old people with little drug use should ration-
ally choose to not insure.  Then, the observed rates of non-enrollment indicate that myopia and 
inattention are significant, and are reducing prescription drug insurance participation rates below 
levels that are optimal for individuals. 
In our Medicare 20 percent sample of all Part D eligible people, Gold plans (combined 
with the relatively unimportant Platinum plans with full gap coverage) have a 9.4 percent share of 
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those enrolled in Part D plans; see Table 5.10  Thus, Gold plans appear to be slightly undersub-
scribed relative to their first-year actuarial value.  The complexity of the valuation of Silver and 
Gold plans, the availability of plans at national average premiums, consumer errors in assessing 
the actuarial value of gap coverage and focus on premium costs over potential benefits, and our 
assumption on the share of generics in gap purchases are factors that may contribute to this dif-
ference in predicted and actual market share.  What the numbers indicate is that risk aversion is 
apparently not strong enough to offset the (perceived) disadvantageous loading of extended bene-
fits. 
The analysis above did not condition on the demographic variables available in claims da-
ta, gender and age.  We find that drug use does vary with these variables, but that conditioned on 
prior drug use, they have little explanatory power.  Thus, further conditioning on these demo-
graphic variables does not alter our general conclusions on enrollment. 
4. Models of plan choice behavior 
In this section, we develop an analytical framework for comparing ex ante and ex post op-
timization failures of Part D enrollees, and present results for 2007 plan choices made at the end 
of 2006 and for 2008 plan choices made at the end of 2007.  
 
4.1 Rational expectations and decisions 
We make the reasonable assumption that at the time of their plan choice at the end of a year 
for the upcoming year, consumers know the drugs they have used over the current year, their 
health conditions, and their realized drug bill for the year, and they can calculate from public in-
formation (e.g., the CMS Plan finder) the projected CIC for each plan alternative they face and 
each medicine cabinet they may need.  Since the open enrollment periods for 2007 and 2008 were 
mid-November to mid-December in the preceding year, this is a good but not perfect assumption, 
as end-of-year events that appear in our information measures may not be predictable by the indi-
vidual, and no public source including Plan Finder makes it easy to carry through a sophisticated 
forecast of the likelihood and consequences of changes in health and drug needs.  We assume in 
practice that the information that each consumer has in year t-1, denoted Xt-1, includes their age 
                                                 
10
 Our calculations are based on 253,080 beneficiaries enrolled in Gold and 23,468 enrolled in Platinum 
plans and 2,936,066 beneficiaries enrolled in Part D stand-alone PDP. 
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and gender, their medicine cabinet (MCt-1, a high-dimensional vector that describes all the con-
sumer’s prescription claims over the year and includes information on each claim such as na-
tional drug code (NDC) and number of days supplied), their end-of-year chronic conditions 
(based on the CMS Chronic Condition Warehouse (CCW) inventory of chronic health condi-
tions), their risk score for expected drug costs (based on the Hierarchical Condition Code (HCC) 
used by CMS for risk adjustment), their overall drug bill, their Part D plan (if any), and premium 
and realized OOP cost (and hence CIC) under this plan.   
Each consumer is assumed to have sufficient information, from the CMS Plan Finder or oth-
erwise, to determine the formulary and benefit design mapping, denoted CICt = FBD(MCt,k,t), 
for each Plan k available in year t in her region11, and to have, from peers or otherwise, a personal  
conditional density f(MCt | k,Xt-1) of year t medicine cabinets given year t-1 information.   From 
this, we assume that the consumer can deduce the conditional distribution of CIC in t given Xt-1 
and k, and its mean and variance 
 
  µ(k,Xt-1) = FBD(MCt,k,t) f(MCt | k,Xt-1), 
σ
2(k,Xt-1) = [FBD(MCt,k,t) - µ(k,Xt-1)]2 f(MCt | k,Xt-1). 
 
For a consumer with fully rational expectations, the density f will be statistically accurate.  Con-
sumers with less than fully rational expectations may have densities f that are not fully accurate, 
perhaps because they ignore available conditioning information or because they distort reality. 
We assume that consumers have CARA utility functions U = (1 – exp(-γ + αCICt))/α, where 
γ is a term that can vary across individuals due to variations in wealth and in other risky opportu-
nities, and α > 0 is a coefficient of risk aversion that approaches zero in the limiting case of risk 
neutrality.   Rational consumers are assumed to choose plans k that maximize the expected value 
of U.  To a first approximation for α small, this is equivalent to minimizing a certainty equivalent 
expected CIC, µ(k,Xt-1) + α[σ2(k,Xt-1) + (γ - µ(k,Xt-1))2]/2.  This utility formulation ignores the 
possibility of intertemporal optimization of a discounted stream of utilities.  For plan choice, 
where the consumer is free to reoptimize in each annual open enrollment period, the conditions 
for separability of the intertemporal problem into a series of one-period decisions are largely 
                                                 
11
 In practice, only about 20 percent of Part D enrollees consult Plan Finder, and it is unclear how much in-
formation the remainder obtain indirectly.   
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met.12  Note that fully rational choice requires (1) use of all available relevant information to 
form expectations, (2) statistically realistic processing of information, and (3) plan choice to 
maximize expected utility.  Failure of full rationality could come from violation of any of these 
conditions, and in general it will be difficult to identify the conditions responsible for failures. 
 
4.2  Ex post and ex ante optimization errors  
Observed choices and alternatives can be compared ex post, the realized costs from the cho-
sen plan against the “what if” calculation of what costs would have been after the fact if the least 
inclusive cost alternative had been chosen.  This allows us to describe consumer “regret” from a 
choice that in retrospect was not optimal.  However, an ex ante comparison is more relevant for 
judging the quality of consumer decision making.  This requires comparing expected utility of the 
observed plan choice with the alternative that maximizes expected utility, conditioned on the in-
formation available to the consumer at the time plan choice for the following year is made.  This 
analysis requires specification of the information available to the consumer at the time of deci-
sion, and of the formation of expectations regarding the distribution of CIC for each choice alter-
native.  Choosing a plan that fails to maximize expected utility, and the certainty equivalent ex-
pected excess cost from this failure, are arguably indications of failure by consumers to protect 
their self-interest, although factors such as a mismatch of the consumer’s actual information and 
our information assumption, our assumption on utility, our assumptions on the formation and 
measurement of expectations, plan features known to the consumer and not taken into account in 
our description of consumer information, such as convenience of pharmacies in the insurer’s 
network, and mistakes that are economically insignificant, may also contribute to behavior that 
we classify as optimization failures.   
First consider ex post comparisons.  Similarly to Ketcham et al. (2011), we define ex post ex-
cess cost as the difference between CIC for the chosen plan and the lowest CIC for any available 
plan, given the realized medicine cabinet.  This comparison ignores risk, in effect treating con-
sumers as risk neutral.  The ex post excess cost is an upper bound on the losses of risk-neutral 
consumers from non-optimal decisions, but it will not be a tight bound unless the consumer has 
perfect foresight on drug use in the coming year.  More realistic ex ante assessments of the qual-
                                                 
12
 Factors that could reintroduce an intertemporal element would be switching costs between plans, leading 
consumers to prefer plans with good expected long-term performance even if they are not first-year optimal, and 
non-separable intertemporal preferences in which habit and inertia enter the determination of consumer well-being. 
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ity of consumer decisions reflect their ability to marshal and process the information available at 
the time they make a plan choice, to assess their own risk preferences and beliefs regarding future 
drug needs, and to go through a decision-making process that evaluates the utility of alternative 
plans and picks an optimal plan. This assessment requires consideration of the information avail-
able to consumers at the time plan choices are made, the manner in which they form expectations 
conditioned on this information, and the decision rules they follow given these expectations.  We 
consider several models of information, expectations, and decision rules: 
(1) Perfect foresight: In year t-1, the consumer forecasts exactly her drug needs in year t. 
This model is of course unrealistic, but it should give a lower bound on excess cost 
which will be tight only if consumers actually do have perfect foresight. 
(2) Static: The consumer chooses the plan that minimizes expected CIC, given the realized 
drug cabinet in year t-1. In effect, drug use in year t is expected to be the same as in 
year t-1.  Let CICSkt = FBD(MCt-1,k,t) denote this static expected CIC, and call it the 
Plan Finder Predicted CIC (PFPCIC).  Brand and generic substitutions are made as de-
scribed above. This expectations model should have zero excess cost when consumers 
follow the recommendation of the CMS Plan Finder, except for difference in OOP cost 
resulting from pharmacy choices (see footnote 9).  
(3) Diffuse (or inattentive) expectations: The consumer chooses at random among avail-
able plans, with equal probability.  In effect, all plans in year t are believed to have the 
same expected CIC, insofar as this is considered by the individual, so that economic 
premiums and OOP costs are irrelevant to choice. The diffuse expectations model 
should give an upper bound on expected excess cost. 
(4) Minimum premium: A related decision rule prescribes that the plan with the smallest 
premium is chosen, in effect all plans are believed to have the same expected OOP 
costs, insofar as this is considered by the individual.  
(5) Herding rule: Another decision rule that ignores CIC and OOP costs is to choose plans 
randomly, but with probabilities defined by plan market shares. This decision rule can 
be seen as consistent with herding, or with consumers picking plans because of their 
familiarity or salience (due to, say, advertising or endorsement by organizations such 
as AARP).  The quality of herding rules depends on whether leader behaviour is opti-
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mizing, and whether followers have idiosyncratic characteristics that make imitation 
sub-optimal.  
(6) Rational expectations: We assume that consumers form rational expectations, statisti-
cally realistic forecasts of µ(k,Xt-1) and σ2(k,Xt-1), for relevant information Xt-1, and that 
they choose a plan k to minimize µ(k,Xt-1) + α[σ2(k,Xt-1) + (γ - µ(k,Xt-1))2]/2, the cer-
tainty equivalent expected CIC.    
 
The rational expectations model is the ultimate benchmark for “good” consumer decision-
making in our analysis, but is also richest and computationally most burdensome alternative in 
that it requires specification of the information in year t-1 available to and considered by the in-
dividual, and calculation of the conditional forecasts µ(k,Xt-1) and σ2(k,Xt-1).  Because of the high 
dimensionality of Xt-1 when it includes MCt-1, it is impractical to estimate nonparametrically the 
conditional density f(MCt | k,Xt-1) and use this to estimate directly the moments µ(k,Xt-1) and 
σ
2(k,Xt-1).  Instead, we use a “method of sieves” and a one-dimensional “sufficient statistic” for 
the impact of last year’s medicine cabinet to estimate these moments semiparametrically. Our 
method does not take advantage of the known fine structure of the nonlinear mapping CICt = 
FBD(MCt,k,t), but with sufficient flexibility in the sieve specification we can recover the relevant 
aspects of this structure from the data.  To implement this procedure, we assume first that the 
static expectation CICSkt = FBD(MCt-1,k,t) is a sufficient statistic for the information conveyed by 
a consumer’s prior medicine cabinet MCt-1, and second that CICSkt and a limited number of other 
demographic and health characteristics in Xt-1 influence the conditional density of MCt through a 
single linear index H(k,Xt-1)βkt, where H is a vector of transformations of Xt-1 and βkt is a vector of 
parameters for each plan and year.  This implementation is also consistent with an “adaptive ex-
pectations” model in which consumers start with the static expectation and adjust toward the CIC 
for consumers with similar demographic and health attributes.   
We consider a number of alternative “rational” decision models with various variables in-
cluded in Xt-1, as described in Table 6.  These variables and transformations are defined as fol-
lows: 
1. PFPCIC (Plan Finder predicted CIC), the static expectation CICSkt = FBD(MCt-1,k,t), appear-
ing in H either linearly or in a cubic spline 
2. Age linear spline  
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3. Gender 
4. CCW, a vector of indicator functions of 22 chronic conditions derived from the Chronic Con-
ditions Warehouse (CCW) as well as HIV/AIDS. The CCW employs algorithms based on In-
ternational Classification of Disease Version 9 (ICD-9) codes, the type of claim (inpatient, 
outpatient, physician services, etc.), and the number of claims within a given time period.13 
5. CCW score, equivalent to the Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score calculated by 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  The HCC risk score is a measure of ex-
pected drug costs based on diagnosis codes and demographic factors and is used by CMS to 
adjust Medicare Parts C and D payments to insurance plans.14 
 
In each version of Xt-1 in the rational decision models we consider, we use the method described above to 
estimate  µ(k,Xt-1), and σ2(k,Xt-1),  and then predict the choice k that minimizes the certainty equivalent 
conditional mean.  We have investigated the effect of risk aversion by varying α in these calculations, but 
do not find evidence for a significant influence of risk aversion on plan choice.  We report results only for 
the case of risk neutrality, α = 0.  
For any of these expectations models, our primary measure of the quality (loosely speak-
ing) of the consumer’s plan choice is the ex ante expected excess cost, obtained by taking the 
difference of the conditional mean (or conditional mean adjusted for risk preference) CIC associ-
ated with the chosen plan and the alternative with the lowest conditional mean CIC in year t, giv-
en the information assumed available at the time of plan choice in t-1, and the model of how the 
consumer processes this information.  In the case of the rational expectations model, these means 
are taken over the sample of individuals with the same information set in t-1. In general, one 
could use kernel or nearest neighbor estimates of these conditional expectations.  In the current 
analysis, we condition only on categorical subpopulations, a simple form of nearest neighbor es-
timation.  
A secondary measure of the quality of consumers’ plan choices is the “regret” the con-
sumer will have after the fact, given by the difference of the simulated adjusted CIC for actual 
                                                 
13
 The 22 CCW conditions include chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and brochiectasis, depression, 
diabetes, glaucoma, heart failure, hip/pelvic fracture, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, ischemic heart disease, 
osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis/osteoarthritis, stroke/transient ischemic attack, breast cancer, colorectal cancer, 
prostate cancer, lung cancer, and endometrial cancer. For detailed information on the construction of the chronic 
conditions, see www.ccwdata.org/cs/groups/public/documents/document/ccw_conditioncategories2011.pdf  We code 
the presence of each chronic condition as of December 31 of the year that plan choices are made. 
14
 For more information on the construction of the HCC score, see http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-
Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Risk_adjustment.html 
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plan choice for year t less the simulated adjusted CIC for the optimal plan choice for year t ob-
tained from ex ante optimization with a specified expectations model, both evaluated at the actual 
year t medicine cabinet.  This is a retrospective excess cost for the specified ex ante optimal 
choice.  This is an imperfect criterion for judging decision-making quality, except in the case of 
perfect foresight, as it replaces the ex ante difference in expectations with the difference of the 
CIC under the chosen and ex ante best plan, evaluated at the realized 2007 or 2008 medicine 
cabinets which are random draws from the empirical distributions of expected CIC.  However, 
this measure averaged over a subpopulation with the same ex ante information will coincide with 
the full ex ante excess cost measure under rational expectations, so that across subpopulations 
with different information sets, these measures will be highly correlated.  The retrospective ex-
cess cost will also provide a measure of “realized pain” that may influence the attention that con-
sumers pay to their Part D plan choices, and may nudge them to consider switching plans.  
Summarizing, we have three valuation criteria, ex post excess cost, ex ante expected ex-
cess cost, and retrospective excess cost; and in addition to the benchmark perfect expectations 
model, thirteen expectations models:  static, diffuse, minimum premium, herding, and nine vari-
ants of the rational model with various specifications of the conditioning information Xt-1. 
 
4.3 Results 
All simulations reported in this sections are conducted for the entire working samples of 
2007 and 2008 (data from 2006 is used to construct the t-1 variables that serve as state variables 
in the decisions made at the end of year t-1 for year t). Due to the large samples, statistical sam-
pling errors are negligible, and are not reported.  
We begin by characterizing optimal plan choices ex post. Table 7 reports the sample pro-
portions of simulated plan choices (given data for t-1) that are ex-post optimal after the year t 
medicine cabinet has been realized. It also reports the sample proportion of individuals whose 
actual plan choice is better ex post than the plan choices predicted by our simulated decision 
rules. The top panel ignores drug substitution, the bottom panel implements drug substitution as 
discussed earlier. First, we observe that the plans that individuals chose for 2007 and 2008 were 
rarely ex post optimal – only 5.8 percent in 2007 and 7.4 percent in 2008. Taking account drug 
substitution, these numbers change slightly.  In general alternatives to a chosen plan will have 
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lower cost if substitutions are assumed, but there can be exceptions when a drug is in the alterna-
tive plan formulary, but on a higher tier than in the chosen plan formulary, or when a drug in the 
chosen plan is much more expensive than the least cost therapeutic equivalent in this plan.  A 
decision rule based on static expectations – essentially, following the strategy used by the CMS 
Plan Finder – does much better: The sample proportion of individuals who would have chosen 
the ex post optimal plan if they followed that rule is 41.7 percent in 2007 and 46.0 percent in 
2008 without drug substitution; with drug substitution these numbers are 60.3 percent and 54.6 
percent for 2007 and 2008, respectively. Interestingly, none of rational expectations rules does 
better by this criterion than following the static rule. This holds both without and with drug sub-
stitution.  Rational models that include PFPCIC in Xt-1 must by construction do at least as well as 
PFPCIC alone in terms of the criterion of minimizing expected CIC, implying that the gain from 
these rational models comes primarily from shrinking the upper tail of the conditional distribution 
of CIC.  However, the additional gain is small compared to the gain from moving from actual to 
optimal choices under static expectations. 
Next, we turn to actual choices. Corresponding to the numbers just mentioned, most indi-
viduals could have done better by following one of the rules we considered – those who show up 
in the “worse than” columns of the table. With a simple rule such as “pick the plan with the 
smallest premium”, 68.3 percent (2007) and 71.1 percent (2008) could have done better. Even by 
picking a plan randomly, about a quarter could have done better than with the plan they actually 
have chosen. These numbers are for the case without drug substitution and even higher with drug 
substitution. One immediate interpretation is that individuals are willing to pay higher premiums 
for features of plans that do not enter our cost calculation, such as convenience. It will be easier 
to assess this interpretation by looking at the monetary losses implied by not choosing plans op-
timally or at least by some simple rule such as “pick the lowest premium”. We turn to this analy-
sis in Tables 8 and 9. 
An upper bound on the losses an individual incurs by not choosing her plan optimally is 
given by comparing the total cost of the chosen plan, and of the plans predicted by our hypotheti-
cal decision rules, with the cost that obtains for the plan chosen under perfect foresight. These 
numbers are reported in Table 8. At the mean over our working sample, these losses are, for the 
actually chosen plan, $399 and $435 dollars in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Medians are lower at 
$249 and $327. To put this into perspective, the median loss as a percentage of realized CIC is 27 
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percent in 2007, and the mean loss is 30 percent. These are substantial numbers, but of course 
perfect foresight is only an abstract benchmark. Among the hypothetical decision rules we con-
sider, the diffuse decision rule (random plan choice) and the herding rule generate higher losses 
at the mean and the median. All other decision rules imply smaller losses relative to perfect fore-
sight than actual choices. Again, the static rule that conditions only on the current year’s medi-
cine cabinet when making plan choices for the next year implies surprisingly small losses of $137 
and $105 at the mean, and $24 and $16 at the median (all without drug substitution). These low 
numbers are explained, in part, by the fraction of individuals with zero or low drug expenditures 
in both years. For example, just over 1 percent of beneficiaries have zero claims, over 9 percent 
of beneficiaries have claims totalling less than $100 in out-of-pocket costs, and almost a quarter 
paying less than the deductible. With drug substitution, the simulated losses incurred by follow-
ing our hypothetical decision rules are even smaller, and zero at the medium for the static deci-
sion rule. Overall, the diffuse and herding rules do rather poorly – choosing one’s prescription 
drug plan randomly certainly is not a good idea. The rational decision rules generate losses rela-
tive to perfect foresight at about the order of magnitude of the static decision rule.  
Finally, Table 9 reports means and medians of the distribution of savings that the indi-
viduals in our working samples could have realized ex post by following our hypothetical deci-
sion rules rather than their actual decision rule. (The numbers reported for the perfect foresight 
rule are the same as in Table 8.) Again, the static decision rule fares well: On average, individuals 
could have saved $261 or $330 in 2007 and 2008, respectively, had they picked the plan that is 
optimal given previous year’s drug cabinet (i.e., if they followed the strategy used by Plan 
Finder). Medians are lower at $159 and $242 but still sizeable. In 2007, this translates into sav-
ings of 20 percent of the actual CIC for the mean and 18 percent for the median. Allowing for 
drug substitutions increases these hypothetical savings dramatically to $579 (2007) and $438 
(2008) at the mean; medians are again lower. Even a simple “minimum premium” decision rule 
would have resulted in savings of above $100 per year on average. As before, the rational deci-
sion rules do, overall, as well as the static rule – some slightly better, some slightly worse. The 
conclusion here is that following a rather sophisticated decision rule that requires a rational ex-
pectations prediction of future drug costs does not, in this particular market, bring systematic 
monetary and thus utility gains, even if one excludes the potentially large costs associated with 
making such predictions.   
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Another important result of these simulations is that the monetary costs associated with 
the plans the individuals in our sample chose, relative not only to the perfect foresight decision, 
but also relative to the simple static rule are substantial – about $159 and $242 at the median in 
2007 and 2008, even if one does not allow for drug substitution (with which they would be 
around $300 in both years). It is hard to reconcile these monetary losses—about 12 percent and 
25 percent of realized CIC with and without drug substitution, respectively, in 2007—with just 
the implicit decision costs associated with using a tool such as Plan Finder. In fact, Medicare 
might take a lesson from Geico’s popular advertisement for its car insurance: “12 minutes with 
Plan Finder could save you 12 percent or more on your prescription drugs.” As suggested above, 
another interpretation is that individuals value plan features other than those we consider in our 
analysis, such as convenience and customer service.  
This brings us to our final question: What predicts individuals’ actual plan choices? To 
answer this question, we ran multinomial logit models in which the chosen plan is the dependent 
variable. The choice set is the set of all (30-50 or so) plans in the corresponding Medicare region 
(the number of available plans is around 40 but varies between regions). For computational rea-
sons, we ran these regressions on a 5 percent random sample of our 2007 and 2008 working sam-
ples, and then used a one-step linearization to obtain our estimators. The results are shown in 
Tables 10a and 10b for 2007, and 2008, respectively.15 The plan-specific explanatory variables 
are the plan premium and additional variables that capture expected costs, computed under the 
rules we just discussed.  
We begin with the 2007 results (Table 10a). The first specification (column 1) contains 
only the plan premium, the CIC associated with the plan, and the PFPCIC – that is, it corresponds 
to the static decision rule where predictions of next year’s drug costs are conditioned on the drugs 
used in the current year. All three variables are highly statistically significant (not surprising 
given the sample size) and have negative signs. The pseudo R2 measure of determination is 0.028.  
The remaining 18 specifications (columns 2–19) include each of the 9 rational expecta-
tions CIC predictions, where the specific expectations models are those described in Table 6 
above. For each of the 9 CIC measures, we estimated one specification that includes the pre-
mium, the predicted CIC and the variance of the predicted CIC, and a second specification that 
                                                 
15
 The numbers of observations reported in these tables refer to the number individual-plan combinations. 
They vary slightly between different specifications because of missing values in some variables that are used to con-
struct the predictors. 
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includes current CIC in addition. Other than the variance measure, whose effect is not always 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, all other predictors are highly 
statistically significant in all specifications. As one would expect, the premium and (where in-
cluded) current CIC always have a negative effect on the probability of choosing a plan (and the 
magnitudes of these effects are stable across the different specifications).  
There are three specifications that have pseudo R2 measures that are noticeably larger than 
those of the baseline and most other specifications (around 0.033 compared to 0.028 in the base-
line specification). These are all specifications that include current CIC; the rational-expectations 
predictions of the CIC in these specifications come from models “rational 1”, “rational 6”, and 
“rational 7” – the models that use only sex and age splines, the CCW score alone, and the CCW 
score together with CCW conditions to predict the CIC. The other specifications which are based 
on rational expectations predictions that condition on the PFPCIC do not bring an improvement 
in explanatory power of the predictive regressions. 
The results for 2008 (Table 10b) are similar overall. Note that every coefficient reported 
in the table is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The sizes of the coefficients for the 
premium are smaller than those in the regressions for 2007, and they change their sign between 
specifications. However, note that in these regressions, PFPCIC and predicted CIC are included. 
By definition, these also include the premium. So the coefficient of the premium captures the 
additional effect, which explains the sign change. Most importantly, as in the 2007 regressions, 
the largest pseudo R2 values are obtained for the specifications that use predicted CICs based on 
the rules “rational 1”, “rational 6”, and “rational 7”.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper shows that there is potentially great scientific benefit in using the detailed in-
formation on health, drug use, Part D plan choice, premiums, and OOP costs in Medicare A, B, D 
claims data.  To deal with the inability to link encrypted plan information in the Part D claims 
data to CMS public files on plan characteristics, we have constructed empirical formularies and 
benefit designs using data from the sub-sample of individuals enrolled in each plan.  This effort is 
successful in reproducing the OOP costs of chosen plans, and appears to be valid for calculating 
the CIC for both chosen and alternative plans.  
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Our analysis of enrollment and choice between levels of plan generosity suggests that the 
share of eligible consumers without drug insurance is in the range one would expect if risk reduc-
tion and the option value of avoiding late enrollment penalties in the future are ignored and the 
only criterion is whether enrollment is first-year actuarially favorable.  In choice between Silver 
(e.g., standard) and Gold (e.g., generic gap coverage) plans, the evidence is that consumers are 
undersubscribing to Gold plans.  This result is consistent with the finding by others (inter alia, 
Abaluck and Gruber, 2011) that consumers pay more attention to premiums than to benefit gen-
erosity, so that they are nudged toward low-premium standard or equivalent plans. 
Calculations of the ex post costs for all available plans, without and with drug substitution, 
and of the optimal choices under various expectations models and decision rules for each indi-
vidual, suggest that less than 10 percent of individuals enrolled in plans that are ex post optimal 
with respect to consumer inclusive cost (premiums and co-payments). Relative to the benchmark 
of a static decision rule, similar to the Plan Finder provided by CMS, that conditions next year’s 
plan choice only on the drugs consumed in the current year, enrollees lost about $300 per year, on 
average. While these losses are rather modest when compared to the losses associated with not 
enrolling at all, an issue we have studied extensively in earlier research, they are difficult to rec-
oncile with decision costs alone.  It appears that a sizeable fraction of consumers either value plan 
features that are not reflected in total cost, or else do not optimize effectively.  Our results then do 
not support the proposition that consumers can make and benefit from good choices in private 
health insurance markets, and direct health care resources to their best use. 
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Table 1: Construction of the working samples, 2006–2008 
 
  2006   2007   2008   
  Number % Number % Number % 
Total     9,086,340   100      9,299,848   100      9,530,609   100  
 U.S. residents aged 65+     7,120,960     78      7,235,063     78      7,403,722     78  
  Enrolled in Part D     3,764,474     41      4,003,149     43      4,215,955     44  
   Non-dual eligible     2,727,638     30      2,951,936     32      3,154,861     33  
    Enrolled in standalone Part D Plan (PDP)     1,730,371     19      1,814,568     20      1,865,320     20  
     Non-low income subsidy     1,618,365     18      1,661,073     18      1,719,953     18  
      Non-employer group waiver plan     1,484,007     16      1,540,757     17      1,579,152     17  
       Did not switch plans during year     1,415,563     16      1,497,138     16      1,535,887     16  
        Prior year PDP claims available  NA        1,253,683     13      1,350,726     14  
Note: Sample constructions starts with a random 20% sample of Medicare beneficiaries. 
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Table 2: Plan characteristics 
 
 
Characteristics fixed by plan 
 
 Whether the first prescription is free 
 Whether the plan applies the deductible to generics (and if so, the copayment for generics 
in the deductible) 
 Deductible amount 
 The pre-initial coverage limit (pre-ICL) amount 
 Whether drugs in the pre-initial coverage limit are subject to Medicare-defined coinsur-
ance levels or cost-sharing tiers 
 The type of coverage in the gap (none, generics only, generics and preferred brands, ge-
nerics and brands, or all formulary drugs) 
 The out-of-pocket threshold amount 
 Whether the plan charges the lesser of cost sharing or the total cost 
 
Characteristics specific to drugs within a plan 
 
 The copayment or coinsurance rate associated with each drug based on:  
o Number of days supplied 
o Pharmacy type (in-network preferred, in-network non-preferred, out-of-network, or 
mail-order) 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for observed total drug bills in 2007 and 2008 
 
 Total drug bill, 2007 Total drug bill, 2008 
Mean                 1,871.7                 1,941.8 
s.d.                 2,221.0                 2,524.2 
1st percentile                       28.1                       23.5 
5th percentile                     111.9                     118.4 
10th percentile                     229.5                     239.4 
25th percentile                     648.8                     647.0 
Median                 1,440.0                 1,463.0 
75th percentile                 2,490.1                 2,556.2 
90th percentile                 3,740.1                 3,850.2 
95th percentile                 4,860.3                 5,063.6 
99th percentile                 8,360.3                 9,114.4 
Note:  Tabulations for all persons in the working sample with full-year coverage in a stand-alone PDP in 2007 with 
positive Part D claims.  The table is not corrected for Part D enrollees in 2008 who were not enrolled in Medicare in 
2007, for enrollees with part-year coverage in 2008, or for enrollees with no claims.  Bills are in current dollars. 
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Table 4: Medicare Part D enrollment in December, 2006–2008 (Denominator File) 
 
2006 2007 2008
Total  65+ Pct Total  65+ Pct Total  65+ Pct
Total 43,338,571 36,316,594 44,263,111 36,965,846 45,411,883 37,896,079
No Part D, Retiree Drug Subsidy, or 
Creditable Coverage 
7,801,239 6,516,882 17.9% 7,053,805 5,799,802 15.7% 6,980,480 5,726,326 15.1%
Part D Enrolled 
   Total 22,854,973 18,368,305 50.6% 24,477,276 19676031 53.2% 25844675 20,790,368 54.9%
      With Creditable Coverage 2,663,377 2,172,276 6.0% 2,922,694 2,406,994 6.5% 2,174,420 1,831,963 4.8%
      Without Creditable Coverage 20,191,596 16,196,029 44.6% 21,554,582 17,269,037 46.7% 23,670,255 18,958,405 50.0%
Retiree Drug Subsidy 
   Total 6,838,613 6,552,456 18.0% 7,009,702 6,715,950 18.2% 6,655,834 6,380,143 16.8%
      With Creditable Coverage 676,496 637,207 1.8% 703,149 659,076 1.8% 624,879 584,305 1.5%
      Without Creditable Coverage 6,162,117 5,915,249 16.3% 6,306,553 6,056,874 16.4% 6,030,955 5,795,838 15.3%
Creditable Coverage (No Part D or 
Retiree Drug Subsidy) 
5,843,746 4,878,951 13.4% 5,722,328 4,774,063 12.9% 5,930,894 4,999,242 13.2%
Creditable Coverage Without Regard 
to Part D or Retiree Drug Subsidy 
9,183,619 7688434 21.2% 9348171 7840133 21.2% 8730193 7415510 19.6%
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 2007-2009 Statistical Supplements, Table 14.4 
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Table 5: Counts by Part D enrollment status of 20% sample and working sample 
 
 2006 %   2007 %   2008 % 
Panel A. 20% Sample: Part D Enrollment Status in December 
Not enrolled in Part D with creditable 
coverage 1,295,192 14.3   1,292,191 13.9   1,312,470 13.8 
Not enrolled in Part D without credit-
able coverage 2,769,583 30.5   2,685,661 28.9   2,630,485 27.6 
Enrolled in Medicare Advantage plan 1,311,554 14.4   1,507,154 16.2   1,724,249 18.1 
Enrolled in employer-provided retiree 
plan (starting Jan 2007)  NA  NA   25,024 0.3   25,349 0.3 
Enrolled in Part D stand-alone basic 
(silver) plan 3,121,961 34.4   3,136,343 33.7   3,223,848 33.8 
Enrolled in Part D stand-alone enhanced 
(gold) plan 93,125 1.0   253,080 2.7   236,295 2.5 
Enrolled in Part D stand-alone full gap 
coverage (platinum) 95,856 1.1   23,468 0.3   75 0.0 
Enrolled in Part D stand-alone plan for 
which coverage could not be deter-
mined 24,410 0.3   1 0.0   1 0.0 
NEC  374,659 4.1   376,926 4.1   377,837 4.0 
Total, 20% Sample 
 9,086,340  100   9,299,848 100    9,530,609  100 
Panel B. Working Sample Enrollment throughout year 
Enrolled in Part D stand-alone basic 
(silver) plan 1,106,503  89.8    1,062,131 84.1   1,113,201 86.7 
Enrolled in Part D stand-alone enhanced 
(gold) plan 81,748 6.6   182,897 14.5   171,110  13.3 
Enrolled in Part D stand-alone full gap 
coverage (platinum) 44,380  3.6    18,280 1.4   45  0.0  
Total, Working Sample 1,232,631 100   1,263,308 100   1,138,105 100 
         
Note : The top panel displays the enrollment status in December of the particular year, providing a snapshot for all 
beneficiaries on the denominator file. The bottom panel tabulates the type of gap coverage for our working sample, 
which is constructed as shown in Table 2. Since our sample is restricted to people enrolled in the same PDP plan 
throughout the year, these coverage counts remain constant throughout the year.  
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Table 6: Hypothetical decision rules and expectations models used in the plan-choice simulations  
 
Shorthand Description Notes 
Perfect foresight Ex post minimum CIC plan  
Static Optimal given previous year's PFPCIC 
Minimum premium Smallest premium plan  
Diffuse Random choice of plan  equal probabilities 
Herding rule Random choice of plan probabilities proportional to market share 
Rational 1 Rational choice with risk neutrality sex, age spline 
Rational 2 Rational choice with risk neutrality PFPCIC (linear) 
Rational 3 Rational choice with risk neutrality PFPCIC (cubic spline) 
Rational 4 Rational choice with risk neutrality PFPCIC (linear) + sex, age spline 
Rational 5 Rational choice with risk neutrality PFPCIC (cubic spline) + sex, age spline 
Rational 6 Rational choice with risk neutrality CCW score 
Rational 7 Rational choice with risk neutrality CCW score + CCW conditions 
Rational 8 Rational choice with risk neutrality 
PFPCIC (linear) + sex, age spline + CCW 
score 
Rational 9 Rational choice with risk neutrality 
PFPCIC (linear) + sex, age spline + CCW 
score + CCW conditions 
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Table 7: Simulated plan choices implied by the hypothetical decision rules vs. actual choices 
 
Without drug substitution 
       
 
Simulated choices are Actual choice is … 
 ex-post optimal [%] better than [%] same as [%] worse than [%] 
Rule 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Actual choice 5.8 7.4       
Perfect foresight 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 7.4 94.2 92.6 
Static 41.7 46.0 13.1 9.8 6.9 5.9 80.0 84.3 
Minimum premium 13.8 13.1 21.8 28.5 9.9 0.4 68.3 71.1 
Diffuse   74.5 74.5 0.0 0.0 25.5 25.5 
Herding rule   66.5 60.8 0.0 0.0 33.5 39.2 
Rational 1 11.2 26.0 27.8 15.4 4.5 10.3 67.7 74.3 
Rational 2 38.8 44.6 13.6 8.2 6.7 8.3 79.7 83.5 
Rational 3 38.9 42.6 14.5 8.9 5.9 7.7 79.6 83.4 
Rational 4 38.8 44.6 13.6 8.2 6.7 8.3 79.7 83.5 
Rational 5 38.9 42.8 14.5 8.9 5.8 7.7 79.6 83.4 
Rational 6 12.3 26.7 26.3 14.7 5.2 10.3 68.5 75.0 
Rational 7 13.4 26.9 25.0 14.3 5.5 10.2 69.4 75.6 
Rational 8 38.1 44.0 13.5 8.2 6.8 8.4 79.7 83.4 
Rational 9 37.9 44.1 13.4 8.3 6.8 8.3 79.8 83.5 
 
 
       
With drug substitution 
       
 
Simulated choices are Actual choice is … 
 ex-post optimal [%] better than [%] same as [%] worse than [%] 
Rule 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Actual choice 1.9 8.2       
Perfect foresight 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 8.2 98.1 91.8 
Static 60.3 54.6 5.9 6.9 2.6 8.2 91.5 84.9 
Minimum premium 37.7 15.0 16.8 35.8 1.6 4.3 81.6 59.9 
Diffuse   61.8 72.3 0.0 0.0 38.2 27.7 
Herd rule   62.8 57.9 0.0 0.0 37.2 42.1 
Rational 1 44.5 27.9 12.4 15.2 1.9 8.8 85.7 75.9 
Rational 2 56.3 51.7 6.8 6.4 2.5 8.6 90.7 85.0 
Rational 3 60.3 54.1 5.6 6.1 2.6 8.5 91.8 85.4 
Rational 4 56.1 51.8 6.9 6.4 2.5 8.6 90.6 85.0 
Rational 5 59.7 54.1 5.7 6.1 2.5 8.5 91.7 85.4 
Rational 6 44.6 28.3 12.2 15.0 1.9 8.9 85.8 76.1 
Rational 7 44.7 28.4 12.1 14.8 1.9 8.7 85.9 76.4 
Rational 8 55.1 51.3 7.0 6.4 2.4 8.7 90.6 84.9 
Rational 9 55.5 51.1 6.9 6.4 2.4 8.7 90.7 85.0 
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Table 8: Ex-post losses relative to the perfect foresight rule ($ per year) 
 
Without drug substitution 
   
 
Mean Median 
Rule 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Actual choice 399 435 249 327 
Static 137 105 24 16 
Minimum premium 268 281 139 193 
Diffuse 486 533 365 468 
Herding rule 433 454 304 358 
Rational 1 227 193 138 113 
Rational 2 130 100 32 19 
Rational 3 132 101 32 28 
Rational 4 129 100 32 19 
Rational 5 131 100 32 27 
Rational 6 216 187 132 108 
Rational 7 209 183 126 106 
Rational 8 125 100 33 22 
Rational 9 124 100 34 21 
     
With drug substitution 
   
 
Mean Median 
Rule 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Actual choice 653 541 389 360 
Static 75 104 0 0 
Minimum premium 215 442 83 268 
Diffuse 632 629 437 482 
Herding rule 650 553 403 372 
Rational 1 97 264 31 102 
Rational 2 69 102 0 0 
Rational 3 66 98 0 0 
Rational 4 70 101 0 0 
Rational 5 66 98 0 0 
Rational 6 98 259 30 98 
Rational 7 97 254 30 97 
Rational 8 71 101 0 0 
Rational 9 70 101 0 0 
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Table 9: Ex-post gain relative to the actually chosen plan ($ per year) 
 
Without drug substitution 
   
 
Mean Median 
Rule 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Perfect foresight 399 435 249 327 
Static 261 330 159 242 
Minimum premium 130 154 90 129 
Diffuse -88 -98 -120 -127 
Herding rule -34 -18 -55 -41 
Rational 1 172 243 93 179 
Rational 2 269 335 159 247 
Rational 3 267 335 159 246 
Rational 4 269 336 159 247 
Rational 5 267 335 159 246 
Rational 6 183 249 97 182 
Rational 7 189 253 101 184 
Rational 8 273 335 159 247 
Rational 9 275 336 159 247 
     
With drug substitution 
   
 
Mean Median 
Rule 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Perfect foresight 653 541 389 360 
Static 579 438 328 293 
Minimum premium 439 99 226 62 
Diffuse 22 -88 -64 -116 
Herding rule 3 -12 -40 -34 
Rational 1 556 277 303 199 
Rational 2 584 440 332 293 
Rational 3 588 443 335 296 
Rational 4 584 440 331 293 
Rational 5 587 443 334 296 
Rational 6 556 283 303 201 
Rational 7 557 287 303 203 
Rational 8 583 440 328 293 
Rational 9 583 441 329 293 
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Table 10a: Conditional logit regressions predicting plan choice (5 percent sample, 2007) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)   
Premium -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0021   
CIC -0.0010  -0.0009  -0.0009  -0.0008  -0.0009  
PFPCIC -0.0002                   
CIC_hat_1  -0.0012 -0.0006        
CIC_var_1   -1.54E-06 -1.32E-06               
CIC_hat_2    -0.0011 -0.0004      
CIC_var_2       -1.12E-08 -3.62E-09           
CIC_hat_3      -0.0012 -0.0005    
CIC_var_3           -6.84E-10 -5.00E-09       
CIC_hat_4        -0.0011 -0.0004  
CIC_var_4               -1.13E-08 -3.82E-09   
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.026 0.028  
Log Likeli-
hood -226342 -246212 -245230 -226766 -226305 -226577 -226224 -226764 -226305  
N 3,229,641 3,517,853 3,517,853 3,229,641 3,229,641 3,229,641 3,229,641 3,229,641 3,229,641   
           
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) ('16) (17) (18) (19) 
Premium -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0021 
CIC  -0.0008  -0.0009  -0.0009  -0.0009  -0.0008 
PFPCIC                     
CIC_hat_5 -0.0012 -0.0005         
CIC_var_5 -4.71E-10 -4.74E-09                 
CIC_hat_6   -0.0017 -0.0009       
CIC_var_6     -7.72E-07 -7.13E-07             
CIC_hat_7     -0.0018 -0.0010     
CIC_var_7         -3.98E-07 -3.81E-07         
CIC_hat_8       -0.0012 -0.0004   
CIC_var_8             -1.17E-08 -4.92E-09     
CIC_hat_9         -0.0012 -0.0004 
CIC_var_9                 -1.05E-08 -4.54E-09 
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.028 
Log Likeli-
hood -226574 -226223 -245528 -244582 -245593 -244685 -226375 -225939 -226367 -225938 
N 3,229,641 3,229,641 3,506,354 3,506,354 3,506,354 3,506,354 3,224,563 3,224,563 3,224,563 3,224,563 
           
Note: Coefficients that are statistically significant at p < 0.01 are printed in 
bold. 
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Table 10b: Conditional logit regressions predicting plan choice (5 percent sample, 2008) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)   
Premium -0.0008 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001   
CIC -0.0013  -0.0006  -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0007  
PFPCIC 0.0004                   
CIC_hat_1  -0.0037 -0.0035        
CIC_var_1   4.71E-06 4.62E-06               
CIC_hat_2    -0.0021 -0.0015      
CIC_var_2       5.16E-06 5.08E-06           
CIC_hat_3      -0.0018 -0.0012    
CIC_var_3           3.04E-06 2.88E-06       
CIC_hat_4        -0.0021 -0.0015  
CIC_var_4               5.17E-06 5.09E-06   
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.038 0.039 0.027 0.028 0.023 0.024 0.027 0.028  
Log Likeli-
hood -251712 -246715 -246329 -249192 -248807 -250158 -249855 -249156 -248771  
N 3,490,225 3,496,126 3,496,126 3,490,225 3,490,225 3,490,225 3,490,225 3,490,225 3,490,225   
           
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) ('16) (17) (18) (19) 
Premium -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 
CIC  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0007 
PFPCIC                     
CIC_hat_5 -0.0018 -0.0012         
CIC_var_5 3.11E-06 2.95E-06                 
CIC_hat_6   -0.0033 -0.0030       
CIC_var_6     3.73E-06 3.61E-06             
CIC_hat_7     -0.0032 -0.0030     
CIC_var_7         3.75E-06 3.65E-06         
CIC_hat_8       -0.0019 -0.0013   
CIC_var_8             5.13E-06 5.05E-06     
CIC_hat_9         -0.002 -0.001 
CIC_var_9                 5.18E-06 5.11E-06 
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.024 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.027 
Log Likeli-
hood -250100 -249790 -247163 -246857 -247131 -246854 -249207 -248855 -249231 -248883 
N 3,490,225 3,490,225 3,485,940 3,485,940 3,485,940 3,485,940 3,485,940 3,485,940 3,485,940 3,485,940 
           
Note: Coefficients that are statistically significant at p < 0.01 are printed in bold. 
    
 
 39 
Figure 1: Distribution of differences between actual and simulated OOP costs 
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Figure 2: Empirical means of 2007 simulated OOP costs for alternative plan types and the Part D 
standard plan designed benefit schedule, conditioned on annual drug bill 
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function of 2007 total drug bill  
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Figure 4: Complementary cumulative distribution functions of 2008 total drug bill conditioned 
on 2007 total drug bill percentile 
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Figure 5: Mean and 95th percentile of 2008 total drug bill, conditioned on 2007 total drug bill 
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Figure 6: Probability that standard plan enrollment in 2008 at a $30 per month premium gives 
lower consumer cost than non-enrollment, conditioned on total drug bill in 2007 (log scale) 
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Figure 7: 2008 expected consumer OOP plus premium cost of “No Plan”, “Silver” (Standard) 
plan, and “Gold” (gap generic coverage) plan choices, given 2007 total drug bill 
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Appendix: Medicare enrollment by age in 2007 
 
Age  
January 
2007 
stayers entrants leavers 
(death) 
Leavers 
(other) 
entrants  
and leavers 
 (other) 
entrants 
and leavers 
(death) 
Start: January After 
January 
January January After 
January 
After 
January 
Stop: December December Before  
December 
Before 
December 
Before 
December 
Before 
December 
64 98,214 393,088 2,704 24 71 1,435 
65 444,480 4,720 5,934 88 17 9 
66 421,186 2,016 6,198 79 9 6 
67 402,074 1,243 6,193 70 11 7 
68 395,671 972 6,753 77 5 3 
69 374,095 831 6,985 66 5 3 
70 355,531 602 7,258 58 7 6 
71 345,095 535 7,784 77 9 2 
72 330,193 435 8,298 86 6 2 
73 306,904 355 8,434 73 5 1 
74 306,732 357 9,154 80 5 4 
75 295,700 324 9,600 86 2 4 
76 293,876 250 10,578 102 8 2 
77 273,060 221 10,660 76 7 5 
78 265,997 211 11,437 82 2 2 
79 256,164 146 12,335 87 0 4 
80 237,797 125 12,633 91 4 2 
81 223,355 124 13,321 70 0 2 
82 210,338 99 13,925 73 1 4 
83 189,343 81 13,754 77 0 2 
84 171,297 56 13,977 75 2 2 
85 157,259 65 14,348 63 0 2 
86 134,761 41 13,946 57 0 2 
87 108,484 39 12,474 45 1 0 
88 95,107 23 12,449 36 0 1 
89 77,746 23 11,273 25 1 0 
90+  295,594 63 60,510 41 0 3 
 
Source:  Tabulations from 20% sample of Medicare enrollees 
 
